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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The sole issue presented for review is whether the Industrial

Commission

applied

the

proper

standards

and

follow the

proper guidelines in determining that Anna F. Webster was partially dependent at the time of the dependency review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts in this case are not in dispute.
On July 20, 1979, Anna F. Webster's husband sustained multiple injuries to his head and body in a motorcycle accident which
occurred while in the course of his employment.
In

August,

1979, Plaintiff

disability benefits
permanent

payments.

began making

Tr. 78.
temporary

total

These benefits were changed

to

total disability benefits on February 23, 1981 based

upon a report prepared by Dr. Robert Baer.

Tr. 139.

On December 15, 1982, Anna F. Webster's husband died due to
complications associated with the accident.

On January 26, 1983,

the Commission ordered Plaintiff to pay an additional 116 weeks
of benefits of $179.00 per week.
previously

paid, equalled

312 weeks of death benefits

maximum rate of $179.00 per week.
Plaintiff
March, 1985.

continued

These benefits, added to those

to

make

at the

Tr. 78 and 139.
the

ordered

payments

until

In February, 1985, Anna Webster wrote a letter to

the Second Injury Fund inquiring about obtaining benefits beyond
the initial 312 weeks.
denied

responsibility

139-140.

Anna Webster

Tr. 78 and 139.

The Second Injury Fund

for additional benefits.
filed an Application

questing continued benefits.

Tr. 30.

Tr. 25-26 and

for a Hearing re-

Following a hearing on June 26, 1985, the Administrative Law
Judge concluded that Anna F. Webster was partially dependent but
reduced her weekly benefits from $179.50 to $89.50 per week.

Tr.

79-80.
The Administrative Law Judge considered numerous factors in
determining that Anna F. Webster was entitled
reduced benefits.

to continued but

Tr. 79-80.

The Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's Order
and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Review on January 9, 1986.

Tr.

139-141.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission followed the mandate of Utah Code
Annotated §35-1-68 (1985) and extensively reviewed the issue of
dependency.

Before determining that Anna F. Webster was partial-

ly dependent and reducing her benefits from $716.00 to $358.00
per month, the Industrial Commission through the Administrative
Law Judge carefully reviewed all relevant facts.
Commission examined Anna F. Webster's monthly

The Industrial

income which was

$1,315.00, more than one-half of which was the dependency benefits.

In addition, the Commission examined her monthly expenses

which totaled approximately $1,300.00.
In fashioning a fair and reasonable remedy, the Commission
was fully aware of the fact that Anna F. Webster would no longer
have a mortgage on her home as of September, 1985 and accordingly
would

no longer have that monthly

Commission also held

that

expense.

Additionally, the

interest earned by Anna F. Webster's

savings should be considered

income.

Nevertheless, the Indus-

trial

Commission,

after

all

of

the

evidence

was

considered,

affirmed a finding of partial dependency but decreased the monthly amount by half.
This Court should apply two standards in reviewing the Commission's Order.

First, in reviewing questions of law, it must

apply the "correction of error" standard.
the Commission

committed

It is submitted that

no reversible error

in the manner in

which it applied the law.
Second,

in

reviewing

the

Commission's

apply an "arbitrary and capricious" standard.

findings,

it must

Again, it is sub-

mitted that the Commission committed no reversible error.

The

findings of the Commission are supported by competent evidence
and are not arbitrary and capricious.

The Commission considered

all of the evidence at the time of the dependency review.
The Commission utilized the proper standards and guidelines
to promote the purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and
to comply with the applicable general rules of law.

By applying

these standards and guidelines the Commission properly concluded
that

Anna F. Webster

need

not

use her

savings

(principal) to

relieve Plaintiff of its statutory obligation to pay her as the
widow of a deceased former employee.
Anna F. Webster has demonstrated her dependency by competent
evidence and therefore is entitled to have the Order awarding her
partial dependency benefits affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN
FINDING THAT ANNA F. WEBSTER IS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT

This Court has established certain standards when reviewing
orders of the Industrial Commission.

If this Court is reviewing

the Commission's interpretation of general questions of law, it
applies a "correction-of~error" standard, with no deference given
to the Commission's interpretation.

Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth

v. Morse, Utah, 692 P.2d 779, 782 (1984).

This standard requires

this Court to determine whether the Commission has complied with
the guidelines of the law.

Utah Department of Administrative

Services v. Public Service Commission, Utah, 658 P.2d 601, 608
(1983).
If

this

Court

is

reviewing

the Commission's

Findings of

Fact, it applies an "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
v.

Industrial

(1985).

Commission

This standard

of

Utah, Utah, 700

P.2d

Blaine

1084, 1086

requires that the Commission's findings

are not to be displaced in the absence of a showing that they are
arbitrary and capricious.

Id.

The issue of dependency must be determined based upon the
facts and circumstances at the time of review as provided in Utah
Code Annotated, §35-1-68(2)(b)(iii)

(1985).

That section pro-

vides as follows:
The issue of dependency shall be subject to
review by the commission at the end of the
initial six-year period and annually thereafter.
If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances
existing at that time, the applicant is no
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or
nondependent person and shall be paid such
benefits as the commission may determine
pursuant to Subsection (2)(c)(ii).

Section 35-1-68(2)(c)(ii) also provides that the issue of partial
dependency "shall be determined by the Commission in keeping with
the circumstances

and conditions of dependence existing at the

time of the dependency review."
Plaintiff unconvincingly argues that the Commission did not
follow the statutory guidelines "of taking into consideration all
facts and circumstances11 at the time of the dependency review.
Plaintiff's brief, p. 10.

To support this argument, Plaintiff

cites a statement made by the Administrative Law Judge.

The

weakness of this argument is exposed by even a cursory examination of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on
July 2, 1985.

The Administrative Law Judge took into considera-

tion Anna F. Webster's current income, including interest earned
by her savings [Tr. 79]. The Administrative Law Judge also considered
140].

Anna

Webster's

current

monthly

expenses

[Tr.

79

and

And, the Administrative Law Judge further noted that such

expenses included the mortgage payments on her home which would
terminate in September, 1985 and, accordingly, would no longer be
a monthly expense.

Tr. 79.

Based upon the specific facts which the Administrative Law
Judge considered
submitted

that

at the time of the dependency

the Administrative

mandates of the statute.

review, it is

Law Judge complied

with the

It is further submitted that the find-

ings of the Administrative Law Judge were neither arbitrary nor
capricious because there is unquestionably a reasonable basis to
support such findings.

II
ANNA F. WEBSTER WAS DEPENDENT UPON THE
CONTINUED PAYMENT 0£ WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS AT THE TIME OF THE DEPENDENCY REVIEW
At the time of the dependency review, Anna F. Webster was
receiving $716.00 in Workers1 Compensation benefits.

These bene-

fits constituted over one-half of her monthly income [ Tr. 79].
Mrs.

Websterfs

dependency

upon

such

benefits

is

convincingly

demonstrated by the fact that she was forced to invade her life
savings when Plaintiff terminated her benefits [Tr. 79].
The standard to establish dependency under the Utah Workers1
Compensation

Act, which

Appellant

broadly

paraphrases

in

its

brief at page 10, was set forth by this Court in Farnsworth v.
Industrial Commission, Utah, 534 P.2d

897 (1975).

This Court

stated:
[T]hat dependency within the terms of the
statute does not mean absolute dependency for
the necessities of life, but rather that the
applicant looked to and relied on the contributions of the workman, in whole oc in part,
as a means of supporting and maintaining
himself in accordance with his social position and accustomed mode of life.
Id. at
899.
This standard has been utilized by this Court in numerous decisions.

Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commis-

sion, Utah, 36 P.2d 979 (1934).

Star v. Industrial Commission,

Utah, 615 P.2d 436 (1980) .
Plaintiff attempts to cloud this issue by demonstrating its
prowess at arithmetic.
the undisputable

fact

Plaintiff's brief, p. 5.

Nonetheless,

is that, at the time of the dependency

review, the compensation benefits constituted more than one-half
of her montly

income

[Tr. 79].

Despite

this

fact, Plaintiff

suggests that Mrs. Webster is not dependent upon such benefits to
maintain

herself

in

accordance

with

her

social

position

and

accustomed mode of life.
It

is respectfully

suggested

that

the Commission

is not

obligated to consider an alternative social position and mode of
life for Mrs. Webster.
sation

The fundamental goal of Workers1 Compen-

is to compensate widows for the income lost when their

spouses are killed at work so that they can maintain the social
position

she and her husband had acquired

at the time of his

death.
Accordingly, it is submitted that Mrs. Webster demonstrated
her

continued

but

partial

dependency

and

that

the Commission

fashioned a fair and reasonable remedy to further the purpose of
the Workers1 Compensation Act.

Hence, this Court should affirm

the final and administrative decision of the Commission.
Ill
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION APPLIED THE
"PROPER STANDARDS AND FOLLOWED PROPER
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING THAT ANNA F.
WEBSTER WAS PARTIALLY DEPENDENT
Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-68(2)(b)(iii) (1985) empowers the
Industrial Commission
Commission

is required

to review the issue of dependency.
by

that

section

to consider

The

facts and

circumstances existing at the time of review to determine whether
an applicant is a "wholly dependent person11.

If not, the appli-

cant may be considered partially dependent and shall be paid such

-7-

benefits

as

the

Commission

may

determine

pursuant

to

§35-1-

68(2)(c)(ii) (1985).
Such payment shall be based upon the circumstances and conditions at the time of the dependency review and will be paid in
a weekly

amount not exceeding

the maximum weekly

rate that a

partially dependent would receive if wholly dependent.

Utah Code

Annotated, §35-1-68(2)(c)(ii) (1985).
Applying the foregoing statutory guidelines to the instant
case, it becomes evident that the Commission did apply the proper
standards and guidelines.
The

findings

adopted

by

the Commission

refer

to Anna F.

Webster's monthly income and expenses at the time of the dependency review.

In addition, the findings acknowledge the fact that

her mortgage payment would end in September, 1985.
the facts

Based upon

and upon all other evidence, the Administrative Law

Judge concluded that she was partially dependent.
Section 35-1-68(2)(b)(iii) (1985) accords the Commission the
discretion
dependent.

to

determine

that

an

applicant

may

be

partially

Section 35-1-68(2)(c) (ii) (1985) then empowers the

Commission to award benefits, the amount of which shall not exceed a stated limit.
Accordingly, this Court must conclude that the Commission
acted

arbitrarily

and

Order can be reversed.

capriciously

before

the

Commissioners1

There is, however, no evidence that the

Commission acted in such a manner.

In fact, the Commissioners1

and the Administrative Law Judge1s Order contradict such a conclusion.

The Administrative Law Judge considered
-8-

all relevant

facts and circumstances and the Commission found that the Administrative Law Judge fashioned a fair remedy considering not only
Anna Webster's interest but also Plaintiff's interest.

Such a

decision cannot be considered

There-

arbitrary or capricious.

fore, the Commisioners' Order should be affirmed.
IV
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT
ERR WrififrJ It RgftfSfib TO REQUIRE ANNA F.
WEBSTER TO USE HER SAVINGS
Professor Larson has stated the general rule in cases involving the issue of partial dependency and a claimant who has
other sources of support:
Partial dependency may be found when, although the claimant may have other substantial sources of support from his own work,
from property, or from other persons on whom
claimant is also dependent, the contributions
made by the decedent were looked to by the
claimant for the maintenance of his accustomed standard of living.
2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 563.12(a) (1983).
Plaintiff

in its argument has failed

to grasp the fundamental

purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.

Plaintiff assumes

that since Mrs. Webster has managed to save some money she is not
entitled to any benefits.

This assumption, however, is in con-

flict with the general rule espoused by Professor Larson and with
the purpose inherent in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
Professor

Larson

concludes

that

the

Court

must

look

at

whether the decedent's contributions to Anna F. Webster were used
to maintain

her

accustomed

standard

of

living.

The evidence

establishes at the time of the dependency review that the bene-

fits received by Anna F. Webster constituted more than one-half
of her monthly

income.

This clearly establishes that Anna F.

Webster looked to contributions made by her deceased husband for
the maintenance of her accustomed standard of living.
The purpose of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act has been
defined by this Court as follows:
[The purpose] is to provide compensation for
the probable financial loss suffered by dependents on account of the death of the decedent.
Farnsworth, supra, 534 P.2d at 900;
Star, supra, 6L5 P.2d at 439.
In an effort to escape the above quoted general rule and the
stated purpose of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, Plaintiff
cites

two

tions.

clearly

distinguishable

cases

from

other

jurisdic-

The first is Akin v. Akin Distributors, Inc., Okla., 386

P.2d 769 (1963).

In that case, the claimant failed to produce

sufficient evidence that she was dependent upon her son within
the meaning of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act.

The evi-

dence in that case did establish that claimant earned a substantial income, in addition to owning valuable stock.

Her deceased

son merely

that

contributed

$50.00

per month.

Under

set of

facts, the Court was required to affirm the conclusion that the
claimant was not dependent.

The Court refused to disturb a find-

ing which was supported by competent evidence. _IcL at 772.
In

the

present

Anna F. Webster

case,

the

Commissioners1

partially dependent

Order

finding

and, accordingly, reducing

her monthly benefits from $716.00 per month to $358.00 per month
is also supported by competent evidence.

-10-

That Order was based

after all material

facts and circumstances were carefully, and

fairly, considered by the Commission.
The second case cited by Plaintiff is Terrinoni v. Westward
Ho!, Fla., 418 So.2d 1143 (1982).
was

struggling

is

substantially

different from the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act.

Claimant had

received
sources.

with

a Florida

In that case the Florida Court

a substantial

statute which

sum of benefits

The Florida Court held

from a combination of

that the Florida statute and

Florida case law supported the conclusion that there comes a time
when dependency benefits may be terminated.
Utah statute also provides for a termination of such benefits.

§35-1-68(2)(b)(iii) mandates that the issue of dependency

shall be reviewed after the initial six-year period and annually
thereafter.

Therefore, if the Commission finds, based upon the

facts and circumstances at the time of such review, that a claimant is no longer dependent, then benefits can be terminated.
In the instant case, however, the Commission concluded that
Mrs. Webster is no longer wholly dependent but is partially dependent.

Therefore, it reduced her dependency benefits by fifty

percent (50%) from $716.00 to $358.00 per month.
demonstrated

that

the Commission1s

Order

It has not been

is not

supported

competent evidence; therefore, it should be affirmed.
V
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR BY FAILING
TO HOLD OR TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT
"5NNA f. WfiBSffiR'S CLOTHING EXPENSE WAS EXCESSTW

11

by

As has been amply demonstrated herein, the purpose of dependency benefits is to afford the claimant the ability to maintain her standard of living.
the

Industrial

Commission

The Administrative Law Judge and

carefully

reviewed

all

the evidence

which was submitted, including Mrs. Webster's clothing expense.
Obviously the Commission's collective conscience was not shocked
by that expense.

It is submitted that Plaintiff's conscience is

insufficient reason to reverse a proper Order.
VI
ANNA F. WEBSTER IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS AS AWARDED BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION "REGARDLESS OF WHO
THIS COURT FEELS SHOULD PAY SUCH BENEFITS
Plaintiff has raised an argument that pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated

§35-1-70

(1953),

it

should

not

be

extended dependency benefits to Mrs. Webster.

required

to pay

It is Plaintiff's

position that the payment of such benefits are the responsibility
of the Second Injury Fund.
It is the position of Anna F. Webster that she has clearly
demonstrated her entitlement to additional dependency benefits.
Her

entitlement

Mrs. Webster

is not affected by this argument.

respectfully

requests

that

this Court

Therefore,
decide who

should pay her the benefits.
CONCLUSION
Anna F. Webster has produced competent evidence to support
her

claim

for additional dependency

benefits.

The

Industrial

Commission considered not only that evidence, but all evidence as
well as the interests of the parties.
-12-

The Commission's final

administrative decision is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

In light of the foregoing, Anna F. Webster respectfully

requests that this Court affirm the Commission's Order.
DATED this ^ o

m

day of June, 1986.
DABNEY,

VIR<
Attornefys for
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed
copies,

postage

pre-paid,

of

the

four

(4) true and correct

foregoing

document

on

this

the 3s>ttt day of June, 1986, to the following:
David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Attorneys for Industrial Commission
Office of the Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Larry R. White, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Employer/Insurance Carrier
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Vlf^Slfr'DABNEY/, E^T/
Attorneys for Webster

ADDENDUM

_ i /. _

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No.85000250

ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of
GENE WEBSTER, deceased,
Applicant,
vs.
L.D.S. HOSPITAL
(SELF-INSURED),
Defendant

* * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* * * * * *

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 26, 1985,
at 8:30 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and Notice
of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius
Dabney, Attorney at Law.
The Defendant was present
White, Attorney at Law.

and

represented

by Larry

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the parties requested
that the Administrative Law Judge take the matter under advisement until June
28, at noon, to allow them an opportunity to reach a settlement of the case.
No settlement having been received by noon on June 28, 1985, the
Administrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the follow.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The Applicant herein, Anna Webster, is the widow of Gene Webster, who
sustained a fatal industrial injury on July 20, 1979, while in the course or
scope of his employment with the defendant, L.D.S. Hospital. The injured
worker eventually died from his injuries on December 15, 1982. On January 26,
1983, the Industrial Commission entered an Order providing for the payment of
death benefits to the surviving spouse of the deceased, Anna Webster, the
Applicant herein. As the result of that Order, the Applicant was paid death
benefits at the rate of $179.00 per week through March 20, 1985, by the
Defendant.
On or about March 15, 1985, the Applicant filed an application for
continuing death benefits from the Defendant, pursuant to Section 35-1-68,
Utah Code Annotated.

ANNA WEBSTER, Widow
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased
FINDING OF FACT
PAGE TWO

Section 35-1-68 (b)(iv) provides that "...In determining the then
existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the Commission shall exclude
501 of any Social Security Death Benefits received by that surviving spouse."
The Applicant's present income consists of the $479.00 per month she receives
from Social Security for a disability award due to her rheumatoid arthritis,
and $120.00 per month which she receives from the L.D.S. Hospital retirement
plan. Prior to the termination of the benefits by the Defendant, she was also
receiving $716.00 in compensation benefits, for a total monthly income of
$1,315.00.
The Applicant's expenses are approximately $1,300.00. As the
result of the death of her husband, the Applicant collected $36,000.00 in life
insurance proceeds, and as the result of the death of her mother, she received
$9,000.00. The Applicant testified that she has $85,000.00 in money market
certificates.
AS the result oi those certificates, the Applicant earned
approximately $8,000.00 last year in interest income. However, she did not
invade any of her savings until the Defendant terminated her benefits,
whereupon she spent $2,600.00 of' her savings. It was also revealed that the
Applicant would be paying off her mortgage in September of 1985, and
accordingly would no longer have that monthly expense.
Without considering the interest income, it would appear* at first
blush that the Applicant would be wholly dependant on the benefits provided by
the Defendant, since they constitute over one half of her monthly income. The
Defendant, by and through counsel, has taken the position that the Applicant
should place her $85,000.00 in high yielding annuities, and that by doing so,
she would realize a higher income than she receives from her money market
certificates. However, the Administrative .Law Judge feels that the Defendant,
is missing the point.
The point being, that it is not the Applicant's
responsibility to find the highest yielding investment so that the insurance
carrier may be benefited. However, the Administrative Law Judge does feel
that the interest income should be considered in determining the Applicant's
disposable income. In other words, the Administrative Law Judge finds that
the interest earned by a surviving spouse should be included as income,
however the Applicant should not be forced to invade the principal or corpus,
in order to meet the everyday necessities of life. After considering all of
the evidence on the file, the Administrative Law Judge feels that the fairest
finding in this case, would be a finding of partial dependency. Further, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Defendant should pay the Applicant
$89.50 per week or $358.00 every four weeks which sum represents one half of
the allowance for full dependency.
With respect to the annual dependency review called for in Section 68
of the Act, the Defendant shall send an Affidavit of Dependency form, which
will be promulgated by the Commission in the near future, to the Applicant.
The form should be sent at least sixty (60) days prior to the one (1) year
anniversary of the date of this Order. The form will be sent to the defendant
and the Industrial Commission by Mrs. Webster.
The Defendant shall not
suspend or terminate benefits to Mrs. Webster after the anniversary date of
this order, unless the Affidavit of Dependency indicates a significant change
in her income level, either by increasing or decreasing.

ANNA WEBSTER, Widow
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Anna Webster is now partially dependent for support purposes.
ORDER:
IT
IS
THEREFORE
ORDERED
that
Defendant,
L.D.S.
Hospital
(Self-Insured) pay Anna Webster, compensation at the rate of $89.50 per week
commencing effective March 21, 1985, and continuing until further order of the
Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, L.D.S. Hospital (Self-Insured),
shall send a Dependency Affidavit form to Anna Webster no later than sixty
(60) days from the anniversary date of this Order. In the event there has
been a substantial increase in Mrs. Websters* income, then the defendant may
terminate benefits after the anniversary date of this Order, and the Applicant
shall be entitled to a hearing before the Industrial Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
2_
day of July, 1985
ATTEST:

/s/

Linda J. Strasburp;

Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on July 2
1985 a copy of the attached Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:

Anna Webster, 3864 South 850 West, Bountiful, Utah
Virginius Dabney,
Utah 84101

Attorney,

412

Reams

Building,

84010
Salt Lake

City,

Scott Wetzel Services, 833 East 400 South Suite 104, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102
Larry White, Attorney, 330 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000250

*
*
ANNA WEBSTER, Widow of
*
GENE WEBSTER, Deceased,
*
*
*
Applicant,
*
*
vs.
*
*
L.D.S. HOSPITAL (Self-insured),
*
*
Defendant.
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

On July 2, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission issued
an Order requiring the Defendant in the above-captioned case to pay continued
dependency death benefits to the widow/claimant, Anna Webster. The Defendant
filed two ce^r.r?.te Moticmr. frr P?v:,ew ?.p?»rtii:r' tv:" cfiffer^r.t defenses. The
first Motion for Review, filed August 28, 1985, argues that the widow/claimant
is not a dependent because of the other financial resources available to her.
The second Motion for Review, filed October 8, 1985, argues that if the
Commission should find that the claimant was a dependent of the deceased, that
the additional dependency death benefits should be paid out of the Second
Injury Fund, and not by the Defendant Self-insured Employer. The Commission
is of tttfe opinion that both Motions for Review should be denied. A review of
the file follows.
On July 20, 1979, the now-deceased husband of the claimant sustained
multiple injuries to the head and body in a motorcycle accident which occurred
while he was making a delivery for the Defendant while in the course of his
employment.
The Defendant Self-insured Employer began the payment of
temporary total disability benefits in August of 1979. On February 23, 1981,
these benefits were changed to permanent total disability benefits because of
a physician report prepared by Dr. Robert Baer which indicated that the
condition of the claimant's husband continued to deteriorate. On December 15,
1982, the claimant's husband died due to complications associated with the
accident-caused arteriosclerotic cerebrovascular disease.
On January 10,
1983, the claimant filed an application for death benefits. On January 26,
1983, the Commission issued an Order requiring the Defendant to pay an
additional 116 weeks of benefits at $179.00 per week. These ordered benefits,
added to the already-paid 196 weeks of benefits, amounted to 312 weeks of
death benefits at the maximum rate of $179.00 per week.
Based on the January 16, 1983, Order, the Defendant continued to pay
benefits to the claimant through March of 1985. In February of 1985, the
claimant wrote a letter to the Second Injury Fund seeking information regarding continued benefits after the initial 312 weeks paid by the Defendant.
The Second Injury Fund responded to her, in a letter dated March 4, 1985, that

ANNA WEBSTER
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due to the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68, the employer/carrier, and not
the Second Injury Fund, was liable for any additional dependency benefits
beyond the initial 312 weeks. Consequently, on March 15, 1985, the claimant
filed an Application for Hearing to have the matter regarding continued
benefits determined by an Administrative 'Law Judge. The Defendant answered
the Application stating that the Defendant had already paid the 312 weeks of
benefits specified in U.C.A. 35-1-68, and therefore, should not be liable for
any additional benefits*
On June 26, 1985, the hearing was held.
On July 2, 1985, the
Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order awarding the claimant continued dependency benefits to be paid by the
Defendant Self-insured Employer. The benefits were computed to be $89.50 per
week, which amounted to one half the maximum rate of $179.00 per week which
the Defendant paid to^the claimant during the initial 312 weeks. In determining the amount of benefits to be paid by the Defendant, the Administrative
Law Judge took into consideration income the claimant was receiving from other
sources as compared against her regular living expenses. Other incone included Social Security benefits she received for her own rheumatoid ar ritis,
retirement benefits due her deceased husband from the Defendant, and nterest
she earned on a money market account with a corpus of $85,000.00. The
Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant should not be required to
invade the corpus of the money market account in order to meet her living
expenses, and also ordered the continued benefits to be paid until a
substantial change in the claimant*i dependency status occurred.
On August 28, 1985, the Defendant filed the first Motion for Review.
That Motion for Review objects to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that
the claimant should not be required to invade the corpus of her money market
account. The Motion argues that, at the time of the hearing, the claimant
should not have been considered a dependent, as she had sufficient resources
to provide for her necessities without the benefit of continued workers*
compensation
death benefits.
The Defendant
further
argues that "the
Administrative Law Judge failed to take into consideration the reduction of
her expenses which would occur in October 1985 due to her completing the
payments for the mortgage on her home. The Defendant points' out that once the
mortgage was paid off, the claimant could pay all her lis-fced expenses without
the continued benefits, and without ever invading the corpus of her savings.
The Defendant argues that based on these considerations, the Administrative
Law Judge should have denied the claimant continued death benefits as she was
not dependent on outside income.
On October 8, 1985, the Defendant wrote a letter to the Second Injury
Fund requesting the Second Injury Fund to agree to pay the continued death
benefits ordered by the Administrative Law Judge in the July 2, 1985, Order.
This request was denied by the Second Injury Fund on October 3, 1985. Once
again the Second Injury Fund pointed out that the May 1979 amendment to U.C.A.
35-1-68 relieved the Second Injury Fund for the previously specified liability
for continued death benefits beyond the initial 312 weeks. On October 18,
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1985, the Defendant presented the Commission with a request to overrule the
Administrative Law Judge, and order the continued benefits to be paid out of
the Second Injury Fund.
Regarding the Defendant's first Motion for Review, the Commission
notes that the issue arises due to the lack of a concrete definition of
dependency as specified in the Workers* Compensation Act. In this case, the
issue is narrowed to whether or' not a claimant need exhaust all financial
resources before a finding of dependency is appropriate. As there are no
legislative guidelines in this area, the Commission ~*feels —that ^in this
particular case, the Administrative Law Judge fairly fashioned the award of
continued benefits by taking into account the interest income th$ claimant
received from her savings and excluding the corpus. The Commission finds this
to be an equitable compromise between the interests of the two parties, and
therefore, must deny the Defendant's first Motion for Review.
The Defendant's second Motion for Review must also be denied. The
Commission is satisfied that the intent of the legislature's May 197?
amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68 was to relieve the increasing financial burde
placed on the Second Injury Fund. The legislature provided this relief L>
deleting the language in U.C.A. 35-1-68 specifying that the Second Injury Fund
would be liable for continued dependency benefits. The code section which the
Defendant feels contradicts this interpretation (U.C.A. 35-1-70) by specifying
a 312-week limitation on benefit^ from the carrier is not applicable to
continued dependency death benefits. That section applies to "special cases"
which are* not specifically provided for by other code sections. As the
Commission finds no clear contradiction in the reading of U.C.A. 35-1-68, and
U.C.A* 35-1-70, the Defendant's second Motion for Review is also denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant's Motions for Review
submitted on August 28, 1985, and October 8, 1985, are denied and the
Administrative Law Judge's Order dated July 2, 1985, is hereby affirmed.

K
<\

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah*, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
^ ^
day of January, 1986.

^

vAAM^

Stephen M. Hadley, ChairmanX
v

\

ATTEST:

Walter T. Axelgard, Cplranissioner

^ ^ ^ T V .

Lenice L. Nielsen, Comirassioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on January
!C
1986, a copy of the attached
Order Denying Motion for Review in the case of Anna Webster issued
January
9
1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Second Injury Fund
P,0. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
-^Tirginius Dabney, Attorney at Law
412 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Anna Webster
3864 South 850 West
Bountiful, UT 84010
Scott Wetzel Services
833 East 400 South, Suite 104
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Larry White, Attorney at Law
330 South 300 EAst
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By .Al Lv.yi <?2<fltL
DeAnn S e e l y

